dc.contributor.author |
Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Inamdar, Tanmay |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Jain, Pallavi |
|
dc.contributor.author |
More, Yash Hiren |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Talmon, Nimrod |
|
dc.coverage.spatial |
United States of America |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2024-03-20T14:30:47Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2024-03-20T14:30:47Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2024-03 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri; Inamdar, Tanmay; Jain, Pallavi; More, Yash Hiren and Talmon, Nimrod, "Controlling delegations in liquid democracy", arXiv, Cornell University Library, DOI: arXiv:2403.07558, Mar. 2024. |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
2331-8422 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07558 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://repository.iitgn.ac.in/handle/123456789/9877 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem. |
|
dc.description.statementofresponsibility |
by Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain, Yash Hiren More and Nimrod Talmon |
|
dc.language.iso |
en_US |
|
dc.publisher |
Cornell University Library |
|
dc.title |
Controlling delegations in liquid democracy |
|
dc.type |
Article |
|
dc.relation.journal |
arXiv |
|