Controlling delegations in liquid democracy

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dc.contributor.author Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri
dc.contributor.author Inamdar, Tanmay
dc.contributor.author Jain, Pallavi
dc.contributor.author More, Yash Hiren
dc.contributor.author Talmon, Nimrod
dc.coverage.spatial United States of America
dc.date.accessioned 2024-03-20T14:30:47Z
dc.date.available 2024-03-20T14:30:47Z
dc.date.issued 2024-03
dc.identifier.citation Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri; Inamdar, Tanmay; Jain, Pallavi; More, Yash Hiren and Talmon, Nimrod, "Controlling delegations in liquid democracy", arXiv, Cornell University Library, DOI: arXiv:2403.07558, Mar. 2024.
dc.identifier.issn 2331-8422
dc.identifier.uri https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07558
dc.identifier.uri https://repository.iitgn.ac.in/handle/123456789/9877
dc.description.abstract In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain, Yash Hiren More and Nimrod Talmon
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher Cornell University Library
dc.title Controlling delegations in liquid democracy
dc.type Article
dc.relation.journal arXiv


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